

# PROTECTING CONVERSATIONS

Basics of Encrypted Network  
Communications



# Naiïve Conversations

- \* Captured messages could be read by anyone
- \* Cannot be sure who sent the message you are reading





# Basic Definitions

- \* Authentication — Act of confirming the integrity of a message and the identity of the person who sent it
- \* Encryption — Process of encoding messages so that eavesdroppers cannot read it, but authorized parties can



# Early Attempts at Protection

- \* Wax seals authenticated a message
- \* Caesar ciphers encrypted the contents of the message
- \* “the quick fox” becomes “WKH TXLFN IRA”





# More Advanced Protection

- \* WWII German Enigma machine produced “uncrackable” ciphers
- \* Signatures or watermarks, combined with shared secrets, give confidence in the identity of the sender





# A Step Backwards

- \* Early networked computers seemed to forget the lessons of the past
- \* Underpowered
- \* Mainly for research purposes

Telnet

FTP

SNMP



IMAP

rcp

SMTP

POP<sub>3</sub>



# Cryptography to the Rescue

- \* Symmetric Ciphers
- \* Asymmetric Ciphers
- \* Cryptographic Hashes



# Symmetric Ciphers

- \* Single key is used for both encryption and decryption
- \* Key is a shared secret between the two parties
- \* Generally speedy
  - \* Popular algorithms are moved into hardware for more speed
- \* 3DES and AES are common (AES is preferable)



# Asymmetric Ciphers

- \* Two separate, mathematically-linked, keys for encryption and decryption
  - \* One is secret, the other is public
- \* Anyone can encrypt using the public key; only secret (private) key can decrypt
- \* Typically slower than symmetric ciphers
- \* RSA and ECC are common



# Cryptographic Hashes

- \* Algorithm that takes an arbitrarily-long block of data and returns a fixed-sized bit string
- \* Designed such that changes in the data will very likely change the hash
- \* Used with symmetric and asymmetric ciphers to produce HMAC (Hash-based Message Authentication Code)
  - \* HMAC protect message integrity and authenticity
- \* MD5, SHA-1, and SHA-256 are common



# Pre-shared Keys

- \* Prevents captured traffic from being deciphered
- \* Anyone who could read message could have sent it
- \* Time consuming to set up
- \* Keys often reused






# Public Key Encryption

- \* Packets are limited to the size of the key pair
- \* Due to padding, 1024-bit RSA key yields a maximum message size of about 111 bytes (instead of the expected 128 bytes)
- \* Arbitrary message lengths would likely require multiple RSA ciphers per message
- \* Signing messages with the key pairs gives authenticity to the messages





# GPG Model of Encryption

Random symmetric keys protected by Public Key Crypto



# Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange

- \* Two parties without knowledge of each other can jointly establish a shared secret key over an insecure channel
- \* No authentication is provided — key exchange is anonymous
- \* Discrete logarithm problem provides security
  - \* Best known algorithms cannot retrieve secret data



# Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange

Alice				Bob		
Secret	Public	Calc.	Send	Calc.	Public	Secret
a	p, g		p, g »			b
a	p, g, A	$g^a \text{ mod } p = A$	A »		p, g	b
a	p, g, A		« B	$g^b \text{ mod } p = B$	p, g, A, B	b
a, <b>s</b>	p, g, A, B	$B^a \text{ mod } p = s$		$A^b \text{ mod } p = s$	p, g, A, B	b, <b>s</b>



# Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange

- \*  $B^a \bmod p = A^b \bmod p$
- \*  $(g^b)^a \bmod p = (g^a)^b \bmod p$
- \* Computationally hard to figure out large secret exponent from the public data



# Station to Station Protocol

- \* Adds authentication to Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange
- \* Basic Protocol:
  - \* Alice » Bob :  $g, p, A$
  - \* Alice « Bob :  $B, \text{Cert}_B, E_s(S_B(B, A))$
  - \* Alice » Bob :  $\text{Cert}_A, E_s(S_A(A, B))$
- \* Encrypted signatures can be verified by the certificates



# Enhancing Basic Protection

- \* Protocol like Station to Station generates a symmetric cipher between known hosts
  - \* Can be used to securely transmit data between hosts
- \* Still vulnerable to several attacks
  - \* Replay attacks
  - \* Data modification
  - \* Side-channel attacks



# Replay Attacks

- \* Attacker does not know the contents of the message, but can see its effects
- \* Attacker intercepts messages and replays them in the future to replicate the observed effects
- \* Example: if a message is seen to cause a missile to fire, can replaying cause more missiles to fire?
- \* Sequence numbered messages allow the receiver to track received messages



# Data Modification

- \* Corrupting messages can cause issues in poorly written software
- \* Desirable to prevent message modification
- \* HMAC of encrypted message contents
  - \* Hash of the contents of the encrypted message
  - \* Signed by the message sender



# Side-Channel Attacks

- \* Attack based on information gained from the implementation of the crypto-system, rather than brute force or weakness of the algorithms
- \* Message length analysis could be one form of side-channel attack
- \* Encrypted messages can be padded to random lengths to hide the real length of the plaintext



# Encrypted Protocols Insufficient

- \* Only protects data in transit
- \* Example: Email communication
  - \* Encrypted session to SMTP server
  - \* Encrypted session to IMAP/POP3 server
  - \* No guarantees about security between SMTP servers
  - \* No guarantees about storage of messages on intermediate servers (caching, store-and-forward)
- \* Solution: Use GPG to protect data end-to-end



# Summary

- \* Authentication and Encryption secure the transmission of messages between two parties
- \* Prevents attackers from reading them and ensures the sender identity
- \* Simply providing encryption is not enough to secure messages
- \* Need to think about data at rest as well as data in transit



QUESTIONS?